Abstract-State estimation is a fundamental function in modern energy management system, but its results may be vulnerable to false data injection attacks (FDIAs). FDIA is able to change the estimation results without being detected by the traditional bad data detection algorithms. In this paper, we propose an accurate and computational attractive approach for FDIA detection. We first rely on the low rank characteristic of the measurement matrix and the sparsity of the attack matrix to reformulate the FDIA detection as a matrix separation problem. Then, four algorithms that solve this problem are presented and compared, including the traditional augmented Lagrange multipliers (ALMs), double-noise-dual-problem (DNDP) ALM, the low rank matrix factorization, and the proposed new "Go Decomposition (GoDec)." Numerical simulation results show that our GoDec algorithm outperforms the other three alternatives and demonstrates a much higher computational efficiency. Furthermore, GoDec is shown to be able to handle measurement noise and applicable for large-scale attacks.
accurate and reliable state estimates for various EMS functions, such as optimal power flow and contingency analysis [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Typically, SE makes use of a set of redundant measurements to filter out incorrect measurements and find reliable state estimates. After that, the normalized residual based statistical test is performed to detect bad data. The latter can be induced by unintentional and intentional reasons (e.g., device malfunctions and cyber-attacks) [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Among them, false data injection attacks (FDIA) is one of the main challenges as it can bypass the traditional bad data detectors [3] .
The FDIA of power system static state estimator was initiated by Liu et al. [3] . Following that work, several other works have been carried out. For instance, two security indexes to quantify the threat of FDIA on power grid are proposed in [4] . Gabriela Hug et al. [5] extended their work to ac model. In addition, the potential financial loss caused by FDIA is investigated. Finance benefits profited by attacker in an attacked market are investigated in [6] , while the impact of FDIA on real-time electric market operations is analyzed in [7] .
To secure the SE results, several FDIA detection methods have been proposed [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . A new L ∞ norm detector softening the influences of FDIA is presented in [10] . A generalized likelihood ratio detector incorporating historical data is proposed in [11] . The short-term state forecasting-aided detection approach that checks the statistical property of the historical data and the received measurements is proposed in [12] . Machine learning based detection approaches are proposed in [13] . The evaluation index using transmission-line real and reactive powers' measurement residuals is presented to identify FDIA. The measurement residual based on active and reactive power flow measurements as an evaluation index to identify the false data is taken in [14] . A security mechanism based on a multiagent filtering scheme with a trust-based mechanism is proposed in [15] . Phasor measurement units (PMUs) are used in SE to determine fault location and ensure the correctness of measurements according to [16] and [17] . Hence, Zhao et al. [18] demonstrates the benefits of deploying a limited number of secure PMUs to defend the attack. A variant Steiner tree and a heuristic algorithm are utilized to determine the positions and minimum number of PMUs, in [19] and [20] , respectively. Also, a new detection approach using distributed flexible ac transmission system is investigated in [21] and [22] as well.
It should be noted that the measurement matrix is typically low rank, and the attack matrix is sparse. As a result, the FDIA detection problem can be transformed into a matrix separation problem, which has been solved by the augmented Lagrange multipliers (ALMs) and the low rank matrix factorization (LMaFit) approaches [23] , [24] , respectively. As a promotion of the ALM method, double-noise-dual-problem (DNDP)-ALM in [32] can also solve the matrix separation problem. However, the computational efficiencies of ALM and DNDP-ALM are not satisfactory, which limit their practical value. By contrast, although LMaFit has a good computational efficiency, it obtains quite low statistical detection accuracy of the FDIA. To achieve a better balance between the computational efficiency and the detection accuracy, this paper proposes a new Go Decomposition (GoDec) approach, which has the following salient features.
1) In the same condition, when there is no noise, GoDec has a similar computational efficiency as that of LMaFit while achieving higher accuracy of FDIA detection than that of the LMaFit; however, GoDec achieves a similar FDIA detection accuracy as that of ALM and DNDP-ALM while showing a much higher computational efficiency.
2) The proposed GoDec is able to handle FDIA detection problems with noise, thereby yielding more practical separation results than those for the ALM and the LMaFit. Compared with the DNDP-ALM, which also considers noise in detection, GoDec has a higher precision and a faster calculation speed. 3) GoDec is scalable to the large-scale attacks while ALM, DNDP-ALM, and LMaFit have huge difficulties. It should be noted that the proposed method is based on the dc power flow model for illustration and comparison with other methods, but this method can also be extended to the ac power flow model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model and explains the concept of FDIA. Section III formulates the problem of FDIA detection using matrix separation technique. Section IV displays the numerical results and the comparisons among other methods. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Power System SE
Power system static state estimator normally utilizes the measured measurements to infer the unknown state variables. The estimation model that relates measurements to state variables can be expressed as follows:
where z ∈ R m and x ∈ R n denote the measurements and the state variables, respectively; e is the Gaussian noise with zero mean and covariance matrix R; H ∈ R m ×n is the Jacobian matrix.
In this paper, the dc model is employed to investigate the impact of FDIA on the power flow on the transmission system, where the voltage magnitudes of all buses are supposed to be 1 per unit. Thus, x only contains the bus phase angles θ, and the measurements z consist of the active power flows F and power injections P inj . Defining z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z m )
T and θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ n ) T , we have the following:
where B is the bus susceptance matrix of the system; X is the reactance matrix; S is the shift factor of line measurements. Hence, the measurements z and the Jacobian matrix H can be expressed as follows:
Suppose that the noise e in (1) is independent, thus, the covariance matrix R is a diagonal matrix. The SE problem above can be solved by weighted least square estimator, yielding the following:θ
Consequently, the estimated measurementsẑ can be expressed as follows:
where
Thus, the residuals of the measurements are defined as follows:
Since the square of L 2 norm r 
B. False Data Injection Attacks
Traditionally, bad data can be detected using largest normalized residual (LNR) test. However, attack vectors constructed by a hacker are able to circumvent the LNR test, imposing significant biases to the estimation results. Suppose that the attack vector is a, the deviation of state variables caused by a is denoted as c, then, we have the following:
Thus, the measurements collected by EMS can be expressed as follows:
where z a are the malicious measurements and θ a corresponds to the result of SE using z a . The residual r 2 in this situation is as follows:
This means that the attack vector does not change the measurement residual, and, as a result it alters state variable from θ to θ + c successfully without being detected.
In practice, Liu et al. [3] reveals that it is unlikely that the hacker can attack all meters. Instead, the hacker is limited to the access of limited resources used for compromising the meters persistently. However, PMUs are widely used in the power system, which can provide accurate voltage angles and power flows. The utilization of PMUs leads to the decrease of meters that the attacker can compromise [18] . These reasons guarantee the sparsity of the attack vectors, and our research is based on this characteristic.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
In this section, the problem formulation of FDIA detection is provided, and the corresponding solutions are presented.
A. Problem Formulation 1) Basic Assumptions:
Before we describe the problem, we first establish some basic assumptions. Next, we will provide three main assumptions and explain them respectively.
i) The attacker can obtain the measurement matrix H of the power system. The power system is a typical industrial control system, and an attacker must obtain enough information to successfully invade the grid and eventually cause load loss. In SE, the measurement matrix H is related to the topology of the grid. The attacker can obtain the network topology in a variety of ways, and based on this, H can be inferred. Researchers in [3] [23]- [25] have carried out corresponding researches on the basis of this assumption. Here, this assumption is only used to construct the attack data for simulation. It will not affect the modeling of the problem and solutions of detection methods. ii) The attacker's resources are limited. Considering that the attacker's resources (personnel, attackable instrumentation, financial resources, etc.) are limited, we assume that the attacker can only corrupt a part of the data. Based on this assumption, the attack matrix composed of attack data for a period of time must have a sparse property. iii) The measurements and states change slowly in a steady state power system. The power system is a continuously changing stable system. Under steady working conditions, the changes of various measurements and states in the system are very slow. Therefore, the data in the power grid change little, or they are almost unchanged over a period of time. Under this assumption, the data matrix composed of the historical measurement vectors and the latest measurement vector will have a low-rank characteristic. All the aforementioned three assumptions are closely related to the actual situation. Assumption i) shows that it is feasible to construct the attack vector using the method provided in Section II-B. Assumptions ii) and iii) indicate that the matrix formed by the attack data has a sparse property, and the matrix formed by the measurements has a low rank property. All these assumptions laid the foundation for the subsequent research.
2) Basic Methodology of FDIA Detection: In the presence of FDIA, the attacked measurement at EMS includes a measurement component and an attack component as follows:
m ×t denote the measurement component and the attack component, respectively; z j and a j denote the measurement and the attack at time j, respectively.
Based on the assumptions given in the previous part, we can find that Z 0 is a low-rank matrix and A is a sparse matrix. This is because most of state variables change gradually (i.e., the intrinsic low-dimensional nature of power grid states), and most of attacks only affect a limited number of measurements (i.e., the sparse nature of FDIA). Matrix separation is a technique, which is used for separating a matrix consisting of a low-rank matrix and a sparse matrix [26] . In detection problem, Z a can be regarded as the original matrix, and Z 0 and A can be regarded as its low-rank components and sparse components, respectively. Thus, the FDIA detection problem can be viewed as a matrix separation problem and expressed as follows:
where rank(Z 0 ) means the rank of Z 0 , and A 0 means the number of the nonzero entries of A. So far, we have transformed the FDIA detection problem into a matrix separation problem. In order to facilitate the reader to understand our detection process, a flowchart is shown in Fig. 1 as follows.
This flowchart describes the process of FDIA and the process of detecting FDIA. When the attacker attacks the system, the attack data a is injected into the normal measurement data z 0 . At this point, the data collected by the meter are z a .
When the system begins to detect the attack, it combines the current measurements with the historical measurements to form the measurement matrix Z a . After that, matrix separation is performed on Z a . If the separated matrix A is not an empty matrix, then the location of the attack and the magnitude of the attack can be determined based on the location of the nonzero elements in A.
The most important section of the entire detection process is the matrix separation operation. The low-rank and sparse matrix separation problem above characterize the low rank property of the measurement matrix and the sparse property of the attack matrix. However, this optimization problem is generally nondeterministic polynomial-time hard, and it is difficult to get a global optimum [29] . To address that, three approaches including the ALM-based methods, the LMaFit, and the proposed GoDec algorithm are presented and discussed.
B. ALM-Based Solution
The ALM method to solve the matrix separation problem was first proposed by Lin et al. [3] . This method is widely used in the engineering field and is constantly being developed by many other researchers.
Next, we will introduce the ALM-based solution in two parts. First, the traditional ALM method is introduced. Second, the latest method named DNDP-ALM developed from that traditional ALM method is introduced. In Section IV, we tested these two methods and compared their performances.
1) Traditional ALM Method: In this approach, the matrix separation problem (13) is reformulated as a convex optimization problem (14) , in which rank(Z 0 ) and A 0 are replaced by their convex relaxation Z 0 * and A 1 , respectively [26] as follows:
where · * represents the nuclear norm defined as the sum of all singular values of the matrix and · 1 represents the L 1 norm defined as the sum of absolute values of all entries of the matrix; λ is a positive weighting factor, which is usually set to 1/ max(m, t) with Z a dimensions m and t.
To solve problem (14) , ALM can be used and the augmented Lagrange function can be written as follows:
where Y is the Lagrange multiplier; μ is a positive scalar; · | · is the inner product. Mathematically, ALM requires singular value decomposition (SVD), which may limit its computing speed and scalability. Interestingly, both exact ALM (EALM) [23] and inexact ALM (IALM) [27] algorithms have been used for FDIA detection. Generally, IALM has a higher computational efficiency than that of EALM as it reduces the number of SVD as well as the time of SVD computation. The IALM algorithm is briefly depicted in Table I , where S τ {x} is defined in the following equation:
2) Improved ALM-Based Solution: Due to the high accuracy of the traditional ALM method, it is widely used in various fields. But, considering that traditional ALM is based on (12), it does not take measurement noise into account, which limits its scope of use. DNDP-ALM proposed in 2017 [32] improved the original optimization problem and incorporated noise into the constraints.
DNDP-ALM is an improvement on the original method, and there is not much difference in the solution process. Here, we briefly introduce this method and give the specific process of solving matrix separation problem.
The optimization problem that DNDP-ALM needs to solve is developed from (14) . Here, we define the measurement noise matrix as N . Thus, the following convex optimization problem 
where β is a positive weighting factor, and · F denotes the Frobenius norm of matrix N . Problem (17) can also be solved by ALM. The augmented Lagrange function can be written as follows:
DNDP modifies the objective function and constraints of the original optimization problem, so that the new method can take the noise into consideration. The flowchart of DNDP-ALM is provided in Table II .
C. LMaFit-Based Solution
For the LMaFit approach, the matrix separation problem (13) is converted into the following optimization problem:
where Z 0 is represented by a product of U ∈ R m ×r and V ∈ R r ×n , and r represents the initial rank estimate [28] . This problem can be solved with ALM as well. The augmented Lagrange function is expressed as follows: Here, the general idea is to factorize the measurement matrix Z 0 into the product of two low-rank matrices, instead of minimizing the nuclear norm of Z 0 . In such a way, SVD is avoided, and the speed and scalability of the algorithms are improved. The flowchart of LMaFit is presented in Table III .
D. Proposed GoDec Solution
In the ALM algorithm, the SVD at each iteration is laborious for high-dimensional matrices. While for LMaFit algorithm, SVD is replaced by low-rank matrix factorization, yielding better computational efficiency than that of ALM. However, both ALM and LMaFit do not take the measurement noise into account, yielding biased SE results. In addition, the convergence of LMaFit is not guaranteed due to the nonconvex nature of the LMaFit problem. Furthermore, both ALM and LMaFit are not able to handle large-scale attacks.
To address these problems, a new algorithm called Go Decomposition (GoDec) is proposed in this paper. The general idea is to replace the SVD with bilateral random projections (BRP). In addition, the measurement noise is considered in GoDec, which is ignored by both ALM and LMaFit.
The error of BRP-based approximation approaches to the error of SVD approximation under general conditions, but the computing burden of BRP is much less than that of SVD.
First, the attacked measurement is represented as follows:
where card(·) means the number of nonzero entries in the matrix.
The matrix separation problem is transformed into the following optimization problem:
The measurements Z 0 and the attack matrix A can be separated by alternatively solving the following two subproblems until convergence:
Note that the two subproblems have nonconvex constraints, while their global solutions Z 0[k ] and A [k ] can be guaranteed [29] . Second, BRP is used to replace SVD for low-rank approximation to reduce time cost [30] , In original GoDec algorithms, the main computation task is to update
For subproblem (23), we mainly work on the low-rank approximation with BRP. Let Z 0 = Z 0 + N and Z 0 ∈ R m ×t . Then, we have the following:
where q is a positive parameter.
Then, the BRP of Z 0 is as follows:
where Y 1 ∈ R m ×r is left random projection of Z 0 ; Y 2 ∈ R t×r is the right random projection; r represents the rank of measurement matrix. S 1 ∈ R t×r is an independent Gaussian random matrix and S 2 ∈ R m ×r is a matrix updated by Y 1 as 
With BRP, the r rank approximation of Z 0 is as follows:
In order to obtain the approximation of Z 0 with rank r, we calculate the QR decomposition of Y 1 and Y 2 , i.e.,
Then, the low-rank approximation of Z 0 is given by the following:
In the calculation process above, GoDec can increase q to reduce the error of BRP. For subproblem (24), we take the first p largest elements of |Z a − Z 0[k ] |, and assign those values to A [k ] in the same position as follows:
Finally, we adopt a positive scalar to check the convergence of the algorithm shown in (32) . The overall flowchart of GoDec is presented in Table IV Z
Although the derivations of all three methods are based on the feature that the attack matrix is sparse, some scholars expand the scope of application when the attack matrix is not sparse. Ganesh et al. [31] analyzed the application in dense error correction by improved weighting parameter λ in (14) slightly, while the performances between ALM and LMaFit are compared in [28] when the matrix is not sparse. As a result, our proposed approach can be applied to dense error problem as well. In fact, in the presence of large-scale attacks the attack matrix can be treated as "dense error," which can be handled by the proposed approach (see the results next).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical simulations are performed to evaluate the performances of the four approaches. Specifically, they are assessed from three aspects, namely, 1) detection accuracy with measurement noise; 2) computational efficiency; and 3) scalability for large-scale attacks. All the tests are conducted on the IEEE 118-bus test system. The method of performing attacks can be found in [11] and [25] . In this paper, we focus on FDIA detection, and the attacked meters are selected randomly. Suppose that in a continuous time period T , the EMS collected 150 groups of measurements from different snapshots. Hence, the measurement matrix used for simulation is Z a ∈ R 303×150 . Besides, in this part, the noise in the measurements is Gaussian noise. The rank estimation r in (21) is set as 0.05 m, where m is the number of columns of the matrix, and p in (21) is fixed as 0.05 mn, where n is the number of rows of the matrix.
A. Computational Accuracy
The attack matrix formed by attackers contains two kinds of information. One is the value of false injection data, and the other is the location where attackers conduct injection. Next, we will discuss computational accuracy from both numerical detection accuracy and location detection accuracy separately, to illustrate the superiority of our algorithm.
1) Numerical Detection Accuracy:
First of all, we will analyze the numerical detection accuracy. To quantify the accuracy of each approach for detecting the data injected by attacker, two metrics are used, including the following: 1) the relative reconstruction error δ for state variables θ
whereθ is the result of SE using Z 0 from matrix separation, and |θ| calculates the absolute value of all entries in θ;
2) the mean absolute error ε for attack matrix A as follows:
where A is the matrix recovered from the algorithm; A is the attack matrix we construct; a and b stand for the number of columns and rows of A. First, we make an intuitive comparison of the four algorithms with a series of grayscale images. The original attack matrix constructed with (9) is given in Fig. 2 , and the attack matrices separated by the main four algorithms are shown in Fig. 3  (a)-(d) and Fig. 4 (a)-(d) . The different grayscales in Figs. 2-4 represents the different magnitudes of attacks, which are generated by us or separated by algorithms. The x-axis represents the sampling time t, and the y-axis represents the measurements in the measurements matrix. Note that the measurement matrices in Fig. 3 are without noise, while those shown in Fig. 4 are with 5% noise (The grayscale image of the separated results with 10% measurement noise is shown in the Appendix.). It is observed from Fig. 3 that the four algorithms detect and identify the FDIA with different accuracies as follows.
1) ALM detects some of the FDIA but it could not identify the magnitudes of the false data. 2) DNDP-ALM has significantly improved the performance of detection attacks compared with ALM, but there are still some attacks that cannot be detected. 3) LMaFit detects most of the attacks but performs poorly on identifying the magnitudes. 4) GoDec is able to detect the attacks and identify the magnitudes simultaneously. In addition, it is observed from Fig. 4 that ALM and LMaFit are sensitive to measurement noise and produce poor results, which is not the case for our proposed approach. In addition, even considering the disturbance of noise in the measurements, the detection accuracy of DNDP-ALM is not as high as that of GoDec.
Next, we make use of indictors ε and δ to perform some quantitative analysis. Under different noise levels, the mean absolute errors ε between the original attack matrices and the separated matrices are calculated and shown in Table V . The maximum relative error δ max is shown in Table VI . We find from these two tables that the estimation errors of all methods increase with the increase of noise level. However, ALM, DNDP-ALM, and LMaFit show higher sensitivity to noise level than our GoDec. For example, with 0%-10% noise, the values of ε for ALM, DNDP-ALM, and GoDec increase from 0.0612 to 0.1449, 0.0610 to 0.1349, and 0.0602 to 0.1296, respectively, while the values of ε for LMaFit are all above 0.2; and with no noise, the values of δ max % for ALM, DNDP-ALM, and GoDec are 34.85%, 28.69%, and 26.19%, respectively, while the value of δ max % for LMaFit reaches to 290.25%. Although DNDP-ALM can deal with noise-containing matrix separation problems, its performance at different noise levels is still inferior to that of GoDec. When the noise increases from 0% to 10%, the values of δ max and ε for GoDec are always lower than those of DNDP-ALM, which illustrates that GoDec performs better in dealing with false data injection detection problem with noise.
Furthermore, we provide the relative error of the voltage angle and show more details of error distribution of the separated results in Fig. 5 . Specifically, we use relative error of state variables to compare the accuracy among all methods. Note that each column of Z 0 corresponds to the result of SE in a certain time. The target of SE is to obtain the accurate state of system, which can be shown by the error distribution of the estimated measurements. Although we have compared the maximum and mean errors among the four methods in Tables V and VI, it is still necessary to observe error distribution of system states with the purpose of finding out the effects of algorithms on all states. Following Liu et al. [23] , we sort the error of separated results from large to small and plot their cumulative distribution functions in Fig. 5 . According to the results, we find that all algorithms have an ability to recover the state variables from attacks. However, GoDec outperforms ALM, DNDP-ALM, and LMaFit. The comparison results at other time instances are shown in the Appendix, such as t = 20, 50, 100, and 150 minutes. In summary, the four methods can explore the low-rank and sparse components in Z a , but GoDec has the best performance. It directly constrains the rank range of Z 0 and cardinality range of A in optimization model as well, which leads to a higher precision of the separation results [29] .
2) Location Detection Accuracy: Then, we analyze the detection accuracy of the injection location. In order to compare the performances, two indexes named true positive (TP) rate and false alarm (FA) rate are defined separately, as follows:
where n attack represents the number of locations where attackers inject data (i.e., the nonzero element in the attack matrix), n sd represents the number of successful detections of injected data, n normal represents the number of locations with no attack, and n fr represents the number of false report of the attack-free locations. The higher the TP of an approach, the higher is the accuracy of the approach for detecting the location of false data injection; the lower the FA of a method, the less likely the method is to cause false positives to an attack. If FA is too high, the system will not be able to identify the location of the actual attack, which will affect the normal operation of the system. Under different noise levels, the values of TP and FA of the four approaches are provided in Table VII. Based on the results, it can be clearly discovered that the ALM-based approaches (i.e., IALM and DNDP-ALM) and GoDec can accurately detect the locations of the FDIA at a lower FA value. Although LMaFit has a higher TP value, its FA value is too high. When using LMaFit, many locations where no false data injection occurs will also be detected as false data injection. Therefore, the practicality of LMaFit is further reduced.
Then, we compare the ALM-based approaches with GoDec. In the case of no measurement noise, the accuracy of the three algorithms is close. When noise exists, we can find that detection accuracy of GoDec is higher and the FA value is slightly lower than that of the DNDP-ALM under the same noise level.
Thus, combining the above discussion about numerical detection accuracy and location detection accuracy, we can conclude that GoDec has a higher computational accuracy compared with ALM and LMaFit, and it performs better than improved approach DNDP-ALM when there is noise in the measurements.
B. Computational Efficiency
In this part, the computational efficiency of the four solutions are compared and analyzed. First, the four algorithms are performed on a small measurement matrix (column m = 100). Then, they are tested on a series of larger matrices (column m increases from 100 to 2100 with an increment 200). The column dimensions correspond to the total number of sampling time. The corresponding computing times are recorded and showed in Fig. 6 .
The following observations are made. 1) Computing times of all the four algorithms increase with the increase of the measurement matrix dimensions.
2) LMaFit and GoDec need less than 10 s for most cases, which shows their capabilities for real-time applications. This is because they avoid computation-demanding SVD procedures. In particular, LMaFit implements the rank estimation with the rank-revealing feature of QR factorization and GoDec factorizes the two random projections with QR decomposition. Thus, LMaFit and GoDec have similar speeds in solving the problem.
Furthermore, we find the following. 1) Our GoDec algorithm is the most computationally efficient algorithm. 2) Algorithms IALM and DNDP-ALM have poor performances under high-dimensional measurement conditions. In both algorithms, SVD is used to solve the problem. During each iteration, SVD is used once in IALM, and is used twice in DNDP-ALM. In addition, DNDP also includes a double loop, which makes the time cost of solving the problem with the algorithm unacceptable. Specifically, IALM spends 100+ s when the column dimension of matrix exceeds 2000 and DNDP-ALM spends 1000+ s when the column dimension of matrix exceeds 1500. Considering the scan rate of SCADA measurements (typically few seconds or minutes), the detection results by IALM might be invalid, and the EMS at the control center might have been attacked.
C. Performance Analysis Versus Attack Scales
Although the large-scale FIDA is unlikely to happen in practice, it would be good to develop defense approaches that can work even in some extreme events, including intentional terrorist cyber and physical attacks' scenarios.
Note that Kim and Poor [25] and Ganesh et al. [31] reveal that LMaFit becomes invalid when the sparse matrix dominates the low-rank matrix in magnitude. Thus, we investigate the performances of all algorithms when a large-scale attack appears. To analyze the influences on the performance of each algorithm with different scales of attacks, we define a mean relative error for state variables θ as follows:
where δ i is the relative error of each voltage angle, and k is the number of attacked meters. In process of test, k varies from 50 to 200, and increases 10 attacked meters each time. The results are shown in Fig. 5 .
According to Fig. 7 , we observe that when FDIA is in small scale, ALM, DNDP-ALM, and GoDec have better performances than that of LMaFit. With the increase of attack scale, the accuracies of all the algorithms decrease. The error of LMaFit becomes unacceptable when the attack scale becomes large. In this situation, its maximum relative error δ max is 402.5%. By contrast, the maximum relative error δ max of IALM, DNDP-ALM, and GoDec are just 57.87%, 54.69%, and 42.18%, respectively. We conclude that LMaFit is unable to detect false data in large scale, while IALM, DNDP-ALM, and GoDec can achieve quite a reasonable performance. In summary, GoDec performs well no matter the attack scale is large or small.
V. CONCLUSION
To detect FDIA in an efficient and computationally attractive way, this paper proposes a new "GoDec" algorithm. We use the low rank feature of the measurement matrix and the sparsity of the attack matrix to reformulate the FDIA detection as a matrix separation problem. The latter is solved by the four algorithms, namely the traditional ALM, DNDP-ALM, the LMaFit, and the proposed new "GoDec" algorithm. We show that our GoDec outperforms the other three alternatives and demonstrates a much higher computational efficiency. Furthermore, GoDec is shown to be able to handle measurement noise and is applicable for large-scale attacks.
APPENDIX
A. Additional Grayscale Image With 10% Noise
We only provide the grayscale images under 0% noise and 5% noise in this section. To further illustrate the impact of noise on detection performance, we give the grayscale image for detection results with 10% measurements noise. The images are shown in Fig. 8 . 
B. Additional CDF Curve at Different Time Instances
We just exhibit the error distribution at a specific time instance t = 10 minute. To give more comparison to illustrate the better performance of our method, we give the CDF curves among the four methods in different time instances, such as t = 20, 50, 80, 100, and 150. The curves are shown in Figs. 9-12. 
